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PARTIAL INCAPACITY UNDER THE TEXAS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
The much amended Texas Workmen's Compensation Act was
again subjected to reparative amendment by the Fifty-fifth Legis-
lature. House Bill 433 was passed raising the maximum weekly bene-
fits from $25.00 to $35.00' with a resultant increase in maximum
possible compensation from $10,025 to $14,035. In addition, those
sections of the act providing compensation for injuries resulting in
partial incapacity were amended to alter the methods used by Texas
courts to compute compensation for this type of injury.2 The amend-
ments are effective as to injuries occurring after September 1, 1957.
In view of their departure from well established court-made law,
the amendments appear likely to disinter problems which for the
most part have lain dormant under the former methods of com-
putation. One of the primary problems will be the determination
of "average weekly wage earning capacity" for those injuries to be
compensated under article 8306, section 11. Further, the amend-
ment to section 12 of article 8306 may stimulate a reappraisal of
the former interpretations of that section and the computation of
benefits under it.
CLASSIFICATION OF INJURIES
Injuries under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act are classi-
fied according to duration as either "temporary" or "permanent"
and are further categorized as either "general" or "specific." 3 A
"general" injury is usually defined as any injury not enumerated
within the schedule of "specific" injuries as set out in the act and
is compensated under section 10 (total incapacity) and 11 (partial
incapacity).' Under these sections "incapacity for work" is both
the contingency upon which the right to compensation depends and
the measure of that compensation.' On the other hand, a "specific"
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, 5§ 8, 10, 11, 12 (Supp. 1957); Vernon's Tex. Sess.
Laws 1957, c. 397, §§ 8, 10, 11, 12.
2 Id. at § 11 and 12.
'See Clark, Commentary, 22 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. XVII, at XXXIX and XL (1956).
4 Id. at XL.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306 5 11 (1953) reads as follows: "While the in-
capacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the association shall pay the in-jured employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty per cent (60%) of the difference
between his average weekly wages before the injury and his average weekly wage earning
capacity during the existence of such partial incapacity, but in no case more than
Twenty-five Dollars ($25) per week. The period covered by such compensation shall be
in no case greater than three hundred (300) weeks; provided that in no case shall the
period of compensation for total and partial incapacity exceed four hundred and one
(401) weeks from the date of injury." See also Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hughey,
266 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
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injury is one enumerated under section 11a or 12, such as the loss
of an eye, hand, or foot. If the injury is specifically enumerated
under either section 11a or 12, the workman's right to compensa-
tion is absolute upon proof that he suffered the specified injury, ir-
respective of his capacity to earn wages.'
Although section 11 has from its enactment' clearly stated that
compensation for partial incapacity from a general injury should be
calculated by taking sixty per cent of the difference between the
t'average weekly wages before the injury" and the "average weekly
wage earning capacity during the existence of such incapacity,"
the majority of Texas courts have computed the award on the basis
of percentage of physical incapacity. Under this method of com-
putation, weekly compensation was determined by multiplying the
average weekly wage before injury by the percentage of disability,
the compensation being sixty per cent of the result. While recog-
nizing that it might be preferable to determine compensation on
the basis of lost "earning capacity," the courts have said that there
was no reason to believe that a different amount of compensation
would result," and that computing the weekly compensation as a
percentage of incapacity was not reversible error.' Such decisions
were founded in the belief that an impairment of the functional
ability to work would inevitably result in a proportionate impair-
ment of wage earning capacity."°
Some of the earlier cases did hold that allowing the jury to com-
pute the compensation on a percentage of disability basis was re-
versible error,11 or at least when the jury made a finding on both
the issue of percentage disability and wage earning capacity the
former was irrelevant." Only two recent decisions have followed
this line of reasoning. In Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Swaim1" the
court stated:
' Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Moreno, 277 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
7Acts of 1913, 33rd Leg., ch. 179, p. 429.
" Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Price, 145 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error
dism., judg. cor.
'Associated Indemnity Corp. v. McGrew, 138 Tex. 583, 160 S.W.2d 912 (1942);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Spivey, 231 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error
ref. n.r.e.; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 222 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
error ref.; Siller v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 93 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936) error dism.
'
8 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 123 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
" Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 94 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
t 5 McWhorter v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 52 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. Tex. 1943); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Reed, 150 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dism.,
judg. cor.; Lloyds Cas. Co. v. Meredith, 63 S.W.2d 1051 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).




If the legislature had intended that partial disability determine the
amount of recovery, it would have stated so instead of stating that
it was the difference between his average weekly wages before the in-jury and his average weekly wage-earning capacity during the exis-
tence of such partial incapacity.'"
Later decisions have expressly rejected the Swaim decision and have
continued to allow section 11 injuries to be compensated on the basis
of functional disability."
Disability, as recognized by the Compensation act, consists of two
disparate ingredients: the first is a disability in the physical or medi-
cal sense as evidenced by inability to perform certain muscular
actions or by the loss of a member of the body; the second is the
lack of ability to earn wages as evidenced by not being able to work
or by having a lower earning capacity.' It should also be recognized
that the loss of wage earning capacity is not necessarily proportional
to functional disability. For example, a twenty percent functional
disability to a laborer's back may make it impossible for him to
work and thus result in a total loss of wages. However, the same
loss of functional ability by an office worker might not affect his
ability to earn wages at all." The distinction made here must be
kept in mind when dealing with the sections on partial incapacity
since it is physical incapacity which section 12 is designed to com-
pensate s and the loss of wage earning capacity which section 11
compensates.'
In recognition of these distinctions section 11 has been re-enacted
with a prohibition against equating percentage of functional dis-
ability with loss of wage earning capacity by the addition of this
sentence:
Compensation for all partial incapacity resulting from a general in-
jury shall be computed in the manner provided in this section, and
shall not be computed on a basis of percentage of disability. "1 (Em-
phasis added.)
It should be noted that this does not change the previously exist-
ing statutory law, since the section is otherwise unchanged, but
"4 Id. at 605. See also Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gloff,
238 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1956).
"Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Newman, 300 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)
error ref. n.r.e.; American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 287 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
error ref. n.r.e.
1"2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation 10 (1952).
17 12 NACCA L.J. 58 (1953).
"Clark, supra note 3 at XL.
"Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 297 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error
ref. n.r.e.; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lewis, 266 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306 5 11 (Supp. 1957).
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merely serves to override those cases holding computation of bene-
fits on the basis of percentage of functional incapacity not to be
reversible error. The mandate to compute the compensation in the
manner provided in the section would seem to require that, before
a correct judgment can be entered for the claimant, the jury must
find the difference between (1) his average weekly wages before
the injury and (2) his average weekly wage earning capacity after
injury, the compensation allowed being sixty per cent of this dif-
ference. 2
POST-INJURY EARNINGS
Since it is the claimant's earning capacity and not his earnings
which constitutes the basis for compensation in general injury cases,"
the Industrial Accident Board and the courts should take care not
to confuse actual post-injury earnings with earning capacity. This
differentiation is requisite in cases where the claimant returns to
work after injury at the same or greater wages, for it seems well
settled that economic loss is not necessary to sustain recovery for
this type of injury." Most Texas courts consider the return to work
and the earning of wages as merely evidentiary on the question of
either total or partial loss of earning capacity where there is other
evidence of an actual loss of ability to earn wages."
On the other hand, some Texas courts have held findings of
temporary or permanent incapacity to be against the weight of
evidence when the claimant returned to work at wages equal to or
greater than those received before injury. In the case of Lumbermen's
Reciprocal Ass'n v. Coody" the court acknowledged that it was
"incapacity to work" upon which the right to benefits depended
but held that:
If the employee receives an injury that does not incapacitate him to
work, but after receiving the injury he still has the capacity to per-
" Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Frankum, 145 Tex. 658, 201 S.W.2d 800 (1947);
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 94 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
"Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 202 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hughey, 266 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error
ref. n.r.e.
"Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Newman, 300 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957);
Texas Gen. Indemnity Co. v. Mannhalter, 290 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
'4Great Am. Indemnity Co. v. Segal, 229 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1956); Gulf Cas. Co.
v. Jones, 290 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Lewis, 266 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.;
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Wells, 207 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref.
n.r.e.; Traders and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Wilder, 186 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)
error ref.
"s278 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
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form his usual duties and does so, for which he receives in full his
usual wages, then he has lost nothing and his injury does not bring
him within the law."6 (Emphasis added.)
This was construed in Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Wagner"
as requiring proof of an economic loss. In the Wagner case the
workman returned to a job requiring greater physical effort and
received higher wages than before his injury. A finding of perma-
nent partial incapacity was reversed in view of the "undisputed evi-
dence" of his ability to perform more difficult tasks at higher wages.
Likewise in the Swaim case a finding of fifty per cent permanent
incapacity was reversed where the workman had returned to his
same job at the same pay."
In some jurisdictions it is held that post-injury earnings equal to
those received before injury create a presumption against loss of
earning capacity.2" It was reasoned in Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Strawn5 ° that:
The fact that he [an employee] may have returned to his same job
at the same price does not as a matter of law establish the fact that
he is not partially disabled. Said fact may be taken into consideration
by the jury in determining whether the employee is partially disabled,
and, if so, to what extent; and, if there is no other evidence of par-
tial disability then . . . it might be held as a matter of law that the
employee had not been partially disabled."2
Thus, though never formalized in terms of presumptions, it would
seem that failure to explain post-injury earnings will defeat the re-
covery of benefits.
REBUTTING PRESUMPTION RAISED By EARNINGS
Although post-injury earnings may be strong evidence of the
extent of earning capacity, this may be rebutted by evidence that
they do not reflect the employee's actual capacity.3' For example,
where it was shown that the intervention of war between the time
of injury and the return of the employee to work caused a rise in
the general wage levels, a finding of total permanent incapacity was
2'Id. at 857.
27250 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
28278 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
29"[P]ost-injury earnings and earning capacity are not synonymous. Earnings equal
to pre-injury earnings are the strongest evidence of non-impairment of capacity, but they
are not conclusive. In most jurisdictions their effect seems to be to create a presumption
which may be overcome by other evidence showing that the actual earnings do not fairly
reflect claimant's capacity." 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation 10 (1952).
3044 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref.
3 Id. at 807.
" See note 29 supra.
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sustained despite an increase in the actual earnings.3 If it can be
proved that the post-injury earnings are a gift from his employer,
the employee will not be deprived of benefits "just because his em-
ployer, out of the goodness of his heart, has seen fit to pay his
wages . ..and has kept him on the payroll allowing him to do
light work."3 Evidence that the employee has been given lighter
work or that his co-employees have assisted him with the heavier
work is usually sufficient to rebut any inference of non-loss of
capacity raised by post-injury wages."
Evidence that actual earnings are not indicative of capacity may
be established by proof that the employment is only temporary and
that should the job be lost an employment physical for another could
not be passed."5 A judgment for permanent partial incapacity was
affirmed for an injured electrician who had returned to work in
a supervisory capacity at higher wages on the basis of such proof in
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Taylor." The court held that:
Although one may be able to serve in a supervisory capacity at a
higher rate of pay, a showing that such positions are not always
available nor as common as jobs requiring journeymen and working
foremen, will support a finding of partial incapacity."
Finally, proof that the claimant worked not because he was phy-
sically capable of doing so but under the compulsion of necessity
will rebut any inference that wages earned are a true reflection of
earning capacity." "Pinched by poverty, beset by adversity, driven
by necessity, one may work to keep the wolf away from the door
though not physically able to work," and the jury will not be pre-
vented from finding from the evidence before them that the em-
ployee is disabled."0
" "It is for the loss of earning capacity that the workman is entitled to recover
compensation. And the fact that a workman may, by reason of unusual conditions, be
able to earn more with an impaired earning capacity than he could have earned under
preceding conditions with an unimpaired earning capacity .. . is no obstacle to recovery
for the impairment of his earning capacity sustained by reason of the injury . . . the
accidental rise or fall of wages actually earned after injury was not made the criterion,
but an impairment of capacity resulting in ability to do only work of a less remunerative
class." Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mallard, 192 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946) error ref. n.r.e.
"Trinity Universal Co. v. Rose, 217 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
a'Great Am. Indemnity Co. v. Segal, 229 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1956); Consolidated
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Newman, 300 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
3"Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Newman, supra note 35; Consolidated Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Baker, 297 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.; Hartford Acc.
& Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Miller, 5 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.
37276 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
'8 Ibid.
"Ass'n Indemnity Corp. v. Potts, 164 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1947); Texas Employers
Ins. Ass'n v. Pillow, 268 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Mallard, 192 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.
"Mabry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1952).
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It can easily be seen that where the employee has returned to
work at greater wages than before injury a difficult fact situation
will present itself as to whether there has been any actual reduction
in wage earning capacity. The courts may no longer solve the prob-
lem by resorting to a finding of percentage of physical incapacity.
Although post-injury earnings may be strong evidence of com-
mensurate earning capacity, their reliability as a yardstick may be
rebutted by showing that they were due to unusual circumstances."'
Having heard medical testimony of functional disability and testi-
mony as to wage loss the jury must translate these totally different
elements into a finding of average weekly wage earning capacity
expressed in dollars and cents. Perhaps this is best done through a
special issue such as that approved in the Swaim case"2 and accom-
panied by an instruction that they are to determine what would be
paid to the claimant in his injured condition in competition with
physically sound men in an open labor market.
SPECIFIC INJURIES
Compensation for the loss of different members of the body is
provided in the Compensation act in section 12, which contains a
schedule of definite compensation to be paid for a specified number
of weeks for the loss of each member listed in the schedule and pro-
vides that loss of the use of a member shall be equivalent to loss of
the member." Under this section the claimant is entitled to sixty
per cent of his average weekly wages for the specified number of
weeks. The right to receive benefits for the loss of an enumerated
412 Larson, Workmen's Compensation 6 (1952).
42 "What sum of money do you find from a preponderance of the evidence constitutes
the average weekly wage earning capacity of plaintiff, T. G. Swaim, subsequent to May 4,
1952 [date of the alleged injury]? Answer in dollars, if any, and cents, if any." 278
S.W.2d 600 at 604.
43The text of § 12 states: "For the injuries enumerated in the following schedule the
employee shall receive in lieu of all other compensation except medical aid, hospital services
and medicines as elsewhere herein provided, a weekly compensation equal to sixty per cent
(60%) of the average weekly wages of such employee, but not less than Nine Dollars
($9) per week nor exceeding Twenty-five Dollars ($25) per week, for the respective
periods stated herein, to wit:
[Herein follows a schedule of nineteen specific injuries such as the loss of a finger,
hand, foot, leg, or arm and the number of weeks compensation to be paid for each.]
"In the foregoing enumerated cases of permanent, partial incapacity, it shall be con-
sidered that the permanent loss of the use of a member shall be equivalent to and draw
the same compensation as the loss of that member.
[Herein is contained a list of five sets of concurrent injuries.]
"In all cases of permanent partial incapacity it shall be considered that the permanent
loss of the use of the member is equivalent to, and shall draw the same compensation
as, the loss of that member; but the compensation in and by said schedule provided shall
be in lieu of all other compensaton in such cases."
[Vol. 12
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member is absolute and the claim is not defeated by a showing that
the injured person has suffered no incapacity to labor." On the
other hand, where injury results to a particular member of the body,
compensation for the loss of which is specifically provided by the
statute, liability is limited to that amount, even though the injury
actually results in total permanent incapacity of the employee to
labor."
However, if the injury to a specific member extends to and affects
other portions of the body and causes incapacity, compensation is
recoverable for the greater injury and may exceed the amount pro-
vided for in section 12, for in such a case the claimant is entitled
to compensation for a general injury." Likewise if an injury was
originally inflicted on a specific member, but it injuriously affects
another specific member, compensation will be allowed for the
greater. 7 Thus where it was shown that an initial injury to a foot
had spread and caused incapacity to the leg, the injured person was
allowed compensation for the leg, which affords a greater compensa-
tion than the injury to the foot."
Before recovery will be allowed for the greater specific member
(i.e., loss of the leg) it must be shown that there was impairment
other than that merely resulting from the loss of the use of the
lesser member (the foot). The injury must "extend to and affect"
the greater member." When the greater member was impaired only
by the extension from an injury to the lesser member, the claimant
may recover only for the greater, not separately for each,"' since the
lesser is a unit of the greater. On the other hand, should two distinct
injuries be coexistent (e.g., a general injury to the head and specific
injuries to the legs) alternative rights of recovery will arise and the
"Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Thrash, 136 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
error dism., judg. cor.; Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Pierson, 135 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940).
" Consolidated Underwriters v. Langley, 141 Tex. 78, 170 S.W.2d 463 (1943);
American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Beare, 225 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.;
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 201 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref.
n.r.e.; Russell v. United Employers Cas. Co., 158 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
error ref. w.o.m.
46Great Am. Indemnity Co. v. Sams, 142 Tex. 121, 176 S.W.2d 312 (1944); Con-
solidated Underwriters v. Langley, supra note 45; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Williams,
142 S.W.2d 1015 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Polk 269
S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
47 Meyer v. Great Am. Indemnity Co., - Tex. -, 279 S.W.2d 575 (1955).
4STraders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Marrable, 126 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error
dism.; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Donnelly, 50 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error dism.
49Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Brownlee, 152 Tex. 247, 256 S.W.2d 76 (1953).
" Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Pollard, 10 S.W.2d 982 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
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award will be given for the greatest benefits the nature of the injur-
ies will sustain.51
The foregoing general principles are considered controlling in
determining whether an injury is to be compensated as general or
specific. When a specific injury consists of the amputation or the
total permanent loss of use of one of the enumerated members,
compensation is a simple matter of taking sixty per cent of the
average weekly wages for the specified number of weeks under
those portions of section 12 set forth in footnote 39. On the other
hand, when the specific injury is in the nature of a partial loss of
use of an enumerated member the question arises whether such com-
pensation is to be made under the first portion of section 12"2 or
under the last paragraph of that section. 3
The question of whether the award for partial loss or partial loss
of use of one of the members enumerated in the schedule of section
12 should be made under the schedule itself or under the last para-
graph of section 12 is of obvious importance since its resolution
determines both the duration and the amount of the compensation.
Under the schedule it is provided that "the permanent loss of the
use of the member is equivalent to, and shall draw the same com-
pensation as, the loss of that member." (Emphasis added.) The
earlier decisions held that partial loss of the use of an enumerated
member was not compensable under this provision but under the
last paragraph. 4 It was held that:
a careful reading of section 12 discloses that these specific re-
coveries [injuries to an enumerated member] are limited either to the
loss of a member or the permanent loss of its entire usefulness. There
is nothing in section 12, prior to its last paragraph, allowing recovery
5sHargrove v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 152 Tex. 243, 256 S.W.2d 73 (1953).
" Those portions are set out in footnote 43.
" The last paragraph of § 12 read: "In all other cases of partial incapacity, including
any disfigurement which will impair the future usefulness or occupational opportunities of
the injured employee, compensation shall be determined according to the percentage of
incapacity, taking into account among other things any previous incapacity, the nature
of the physical injury or disfigurement, the occupation of the injured employee, and
the age at the time of injury. The compensation paid therefor shall be sixty per cent(60%) of the average weekly wages of the employees but not to exceed Twenty-five
Dollars ($25) per week, multiplied by the percentage of incapacity caused by the injury
for such period not exceeding three hundred (300) weeks as the board may determine.
Whenever the weekly payments under this paragraph would be less than Three Dollars
($3) per week, the period may be shortened, and the payments correspondingly increased
by the board."
54Maryland Cas. Co. v. Laughlin, 29 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1928); Millers' Indemnity
Underwriters Corp. v. Cahal, 257 S.W. 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Ferguson, 252 S.W. 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error ref.; Western Indemnity Co. v.
Milam, 230 S.W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) error ref.
[ Vol. 12
COMMENTS
for the temporary or permanent partial loss of the usefulness of an
55arm.
Those courts which held that partial loss of the usefullness of an
enumerated member was to be compensated under the last para-
graph of section 12 were then faced with the necessity of determining
amount of maximum weekly compensation."
The compensation paid therefore shall be sixty per cent (60%) of
the average weekly wages of the employees but not to exceed Twenty-
five Dollars ($25) per week, multiplied by the percentage of incap-
acity caused by the injury . . ." (Emphasis added.)
By some courts the phrase "not to exceed Twenty-Five Dollars"
was interpreted to limit sixty per cent of the average weekly wages
to twenty-five dollars per week and that the ultimate compensation
was fixed by multplying this by the percentage of incapacity." By
other courts it was held that the phrase served to limit only the
amount of maximum weekly compensation."
In a series of four opinions over a like number of years the Texas
Commission of Appeals seemingly resolved the question of whether
partial loss of use of an enumerated member was to be compensated
under the schedule or the last paragraph of section 12. In view of
their importance it would seem that they deserve close analysis. In
Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Pollard"5 the jury had found that
the claimant had suffered a 75 per cent disability to his right hand
and a 65 per cent disability to his right arm, and that each of these
disabilities was permanent. The Court of Civil Appeals held that
since the claimant had lost neither hand nor arm nor the total use
of either, recovery could not be had under the specific injury pro-
vision of that statute, but should be governed by the last paragraph
of section 12." 0 The Commission of Appeals quoted schedule pro-
visions of section 1261 and stated:
• . . We think the injury in this case falls under the next to the last
paragraph of section 12 of article 8306 . . . we think it was contem-
plated by the provision above quoted the next to the last paragraph of
section 12 that, if a person lost the complete use of a member, it should
"Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Moreno, 277 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 12 (1953).
" Western Indemnity Co. v. Milam, 230 S.W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Millers'
Indemnity Underwriters Corp. v. Cahal, 257 S.W. 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
" Maryland Cas. Co. v. Laughlin, 29 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1928); Dohman v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 285 S.W. 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Ferguson, 252 S.W. 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error ref.
5 10 S.W.2d 982 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
60295 S.W. 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
" The portions cited by the court were those contained in footnote 43.
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be considered the same as if the member had been amputated, and
further, that, if the person has a permanent partial incapacity to a
member, he should receive the compensation provided in section 12
for the loss of the specific member proportioned to the percentage of
incapacity which the loss sustained would bear to the total loss of the
member."' (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Seale"' the claimant suffered
an injury to his foot. There was no allegation that the injury ex-
tended to any other portion of the body, but there was an allegation
that the claimant was totally and permanently disabled. The jury
found that he had suffered 85 per cent permanent incapacity to
labor and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a judgment for 300
weeks as being proper under the last paragraph of section 12.64 The
Commission of Appeals reversed, holding that the injury was cov-
ered by the schedule and that a permanent partial incapacity to
a specific member of the body must be compensated at the same
rate provided for the loss of the member, multiplied by the per-
centage of incapacity found to exist.
The Seale case was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Maledon.5 Again an award for 300
weeks under the last paragraph for partial loss of the use of a
specific member was reversed and the claimant was restricted to
that period specified for his injury in the schedule. The next to the
last paragraph was referred to by the Court and was held to pro-
vide the measure of compensation.
In Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Munday66 judgment had been en-
tered for the claimant for 15 weeks temporary total loss of the use
of his hand and an additional 135 weeks for permanent partial loss
of use. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Com-
mission of Appeals which stated:
With regard to a permanent partial loss of the use of a hand, it has been
repeatedly held, in effect, that such a loss comes within the purview of
the above provisions the schedule and the next to the last paragraph
of section 12 and that payment of compensation each week, as there
provided, is required to be made in the proportion that the use of the
hand is permanently lost .... In conference with the Supreme Court,
we have been authorized to declare all holdings to the contrary, in
other cases overruled. 7
62 10 S.W.2d 982 at 982-83.
63 13 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
64Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Stale, 4 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
6527 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
0644 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
67 Id. at 928.
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With regard to the temporary total loss of the use, the Commission
held that this was contemplated by the same provisions and that
the duration of the loss should control the number of weeks com-
pensation subject to the same time limitations as in the case of perma-
nent loss of use. Thus it seemed settled that temporary total and per-
manent partial loss of the use of a member was to be compensated
under the schedule of injuries contained in section 12 rather than
under the last paragraph."
The Holmes Decision
In 1946 the case of Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes"0 came
before the Supreme Court. Holmes was a welder with an average
weekly wage of $95.24. The jury found that he had suffered a
thirty-five per cent permanent partial loss of the use of his right
leg. It should be noted that this was the same type of injury that
was considered in the preceding cases. All parties agreed that under
the schedule 200 weeks was the applicable period of compensation,
but disagreed as to the computation of the award. The case was
brought before the Court on a certified question seeking an inter-
pretation of the last paragraph of section 12. The question was:
Should the weekly compensation to be paid the employee, for
thirty-five per cent permanent partial loss of use of his leg, be
$20.00 (the statutory maximum at that time) instead of thirty-five
per cent of the maximum or $7.00 per week? It seems that the
attorneys for both sides, as well as the majority of the Court, assum-
ed that the last paragraph of section 12 was controlling. In a five
to four decision the Court held that the phrase "but not to ex-
ceed . . ." contained in the last paragraph served as a limitation
on the final compensation to be paid and not as a limitation on
the intermediate figure of sixty per cent of the average weekly
wage. Therefore, since sixty per cent of his average weekly wage
multiplied by the percentage of disablity exceded that maximum,
Holmes was held to be entitled to the maximum compensation.
Justice Folley in a dissent joined by Justices Hickman and Brew-
ster recognized that the last paragraph was not applicable to such
an injury. He argued:
That the injury here involved is not governed by the last paragraph
of the section, but by previous paragraphs thereof, is no longer an open
question in this state. This has been definitely settled by decisions
66Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Patterson, 144 Tex. 573, 192 S.W.2d 255 (1946);
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Shultz, 56 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.69145 Tex. 158, 199 S.W.2d 390 (1946).
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which have the express or implied approval of this court, and all of
which involve the same character of injury with which we are pres-
ently dealing."0
Compensation for this type of injury, he said, was to be computed
under the first paragraph of the section and under those paragraphs
providing that "in all cases of permanent partial incapacity ... the
permanent partial loss of use of the member is equivalent to . . .the
loss of that member."
During the last legislature section 12 was amended to allow thirty-
five dollars per week maximum compensation and the final para-
graph was amended to nullify the Holmes interpretation of the
phrase "but not to exceed ... ."" It is now provided that:
The compensation paid therefore shall be calculated ...by first de-
termining a basic figure amounting to sixty per cent (60%) of the
average weekly wages of the employee, but which basic figure shall
not exceed Thirty-five Dollars ($35); such basic figure shall then be
multiplied by the percentage of incapacity caused by the injury, and
the result shall be the weekly compensation which shall be paid for
such period not exceeding three hundred (300) weeks.... .
Thus it seems clear that with regard to those injuries to which the
last paragraph of section 12 applies, if sixty per cent of the average
weekly wage exceeds the maximum of thirty-five dollars it must
first be reduced to the maximum and then multiplied by the per-
centage of incapacity.
It is submitted, however, that in view of the Pollard, Seale,
Maledon, and Munday cases, this last paragraph and the amendment
thereto is not applicable to either temporary total or permanent
partial loss of use of an enumerated member. Section 12 under the
schedule provides that "in all cases of permanent partial incapacity,
.. . the permanent loss of use of the member is equivalent to . ..
the loss of the member." The Commission of Appeals and the Su-
preme Court held in the foregoing cases that this phrase contem-
plated temporary total and permanent partial loss of use as well
as total permanent loss of use. 3 This writer's research reveals nothing
that would indicate that these cases are not still effective.
When the final paragraph is considered in relation to the schedule
of section 12, it will be seen that it contains elements entirely for-
" Id. at 400.
" Vernon's Tex. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 397, 5 12.
72 Ibid.
" The Supreme Court seems to have re-affirmed these principles in Texas Employers
Ins. Ass'n v. Patterson, 144 Tex. 573, 192 S.W.2d 255 (1946).
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eign to the concept of enumerated injuries. For the injuries included
in the last paragraph it is provided that the compensation shall be
determined according to the percentage of incapacity. In determin-
ing this percentage the Industrial Accident Board is permitted by
the paragraph to take into consideration the impairment of oc-
cupational opportunty, the occupation of the injured employee,
and his age at the time of the injury. Yet all of these factors are
immaterial in determining the compensation for the injuries speci-
fied in the other paragraphs of section 12. The final paragraph al-
lows a flexible and changing compensation period according to the
facts of the case, but the compensation period for those injuries
contained in the schedule is definitely fixed by that schedule. It
can be seen that these factors, immaterial to the computation of
award for a scheduled injury, set this paragraph apart from the pre-
ceding portions of the section."
If then compensation for permanent partial loss of use of an
enumerated member is to be controlled by the first paragraph and
the next to the last paragraph of section 12, as held in the Munday
case, it must be determined what the compensation will be when sixty
per cent of the average weekly wage proportioned to the percentage
of permanent loss of use exceeds the statutory maximum. It is sub-
mitted that when sixty per cent of the average weekly wage is
multiplied by the percentage of incapacity and this amount exceeds
the maximum permissable rate, the injured workman is entitled
to receive the maximum rate for the period specified. Unlike its
last paragraph, section 12 begins: "For the injuries enumerated in
the following schedule the employee shall receive . . . a weekly
compensation equal to sixty per cent (60%) of the average weekly
wages of such employee, but not . . . exceeding Thirty-five Dollars
per week. . . ." It would seem that the only limitation is placed
upon the compensation actually paid.
The fact that a workman with only a permanent partial loss
of use of a member would receive the same compensation as a work-
man whose member had been amputated should not prove a bar to
this interpretation. In this section as well as in sections 10 and 11
the legislature has set a maximum limit above which compensation
cannot go. If under section 10 a workman earning $120 per week
and another earning $60 per week each suffers total permanent im-
pairment, both would receive the $35 maximum although one has
suffered twice the loss of the other. Similar illustrations might be




drawn from section 11 concerning loss of earning capacity. This is
true not because of any possible misinterpretations of the statute,
but because the act prescribes maximum benefits."
"All Other Cases of Partial Incapacity"
If the final paragraph of section 12 is not referable to partial
loss of use of an enumerated member, to what then is it applicable?
It has been seen that sections 10 and 11 provide compensation for
general injuries from which the workman suffers a loss of earning
capacity. The schedule of section 12 specifically covers the severance
or total permanent loss of use of those members enumerated. The
schedule has been interpreted to cover temporary total and per-
manent partial loss of use. It has been said that:
In the concluding paragraph of section 12, the Legislature in the
phrase "in all other cases of partial incapacity" was referring to all
cases of partial physical incapacity other than those set forth in the
schedule, meaning any injury to a non-enumerated part of the body,
and also any that affected the body generally .... Thus compensation
for any injury affecting the body in general is provided for by the last
paragraph of section 12, if no economic disadvantage results from the
injury, while compensation is provided for such a general injury un-
der section 10 or 11, if there is impairment of wage earning."6
Justice Folley writing in his dissent in the Holmes decision was of
a similar opinion:
It is therefore obvious that the last paragraph of section 12 is an inde-
pendent provision intended to apply only to such cases of partial in-
capacity as are not specified in other portions of the section. If I may
be permitted to speculate, when we have some injury less than general,
such as the amputation of an ear or a nose, or where some similar in-jury or disfigurement not specified in the section impairs the future
usefulness or occupational opportunities of an employee, then, and not
until then, will the last paragraph of section 12 become pertinent."
(Emphasis added.)
If the final paragraph is interpreted in this manner then the mandate
for the Board to consider impairment of future usefulness or oc-
cupational opportunities, the nature of the physical injury, the oc-
cupation, and the age of the injured employee takes on meaning
where before it had none.
"s Industrial Acc. Bd. v. Glenn, 144 Tex. 573, 190 S.W.2d 805, 810 (1945)
dissent; Associated Indemnity Corp. v. McGrew, 138 Tex. 583, 160 S.W.2d 912 (1942).76Lawler, Texas Workmen's Compensation Law 234 (1938).
"eTexas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 196 S.W.2d 390, 402 (1946)(dissent).
[Vol. 12
19 5 8] COMMENTS 115
CONCLUSION
Interpreting the act in this manner it would seem a complete and
comprehensive scheme of compensation. A workman suffering a
general injury and a loss of wage earning capacity will be compen-
sated under sections 10 or 11. The workman suffering either the
total or partial loss, or total or partial loss of use, of a member
or members enumerated in the act would receive benefits under the
schedule of section 12. An injury resulting in impairment of future
occupational opportunities or capacity, but suffering no present
loss if not covered by the schedule would turn to the final para-
graph of section 12 for relief. It is believed that such an interpre-
tation furthers the objective of providing speedy and equitable
compensation for every injury.
Don M. Dean
